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In the last two decades, France has experienced an increase in 
mismatches between education and work. This article studies twenty 
two years of French productivity to highlight the causes and effects of 
overeducation on the employee wages and the national income. From 
the INSEE and Cereq data, this analysis shows a positive effect in the 
short term on wages of the least qualified and overeducated worker. 
Furthermore, overeducation phenomenon does not penalize the higher 
graduates. Paradoxically, if it is always profitable for individuals to 
increase their education investment; in term of growth, overeducation 
of the higher graduates produce an unfavourable short term effect on 
GDP.     
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In this last four decades, the French growth of the number of students has increased at 
unprecedented rate: in one half-century, the studies duration doubled (Estrade and Minni, 
1996). This evolution is explained by the expansion of compulsory schooling, the training 
diversification offer by the educational system and the selectivity decrease (Magnac and 
Thesmar, 2002). This large extent of the number of students, and the employment crisis in 
these last decades, modified the functioning of the labour market: for example, Forgeot and 
Gautié, 1997; Guironnet, 2006a show a large overeducation extent for younger graduates.
1  
Freeman (1976) was one of the pioneers in research on the overeducation 
phenomenon: his work had a catalyst effect. In the USA, he finds that the benefit rate for a 
degree level had significantly decreased on the Seventies. Freeman assigned this fall to an 
excess of graduates offer. The interest of his results is that they call into question the belief 
that a higher degree represented a profitable investment and a virtual guarantee of economic 
success.
2 On this basis, overeducation literature develops the idea of a mismatch between 
supply and demand of graduates (Hartog, 2000; Freeman, 1971; Diebolt, 2001).   
The overeducation evolution reflects some rigidity on the labour market like the 
problems of information asymmetry described by theoretical models (Thurow, 1972; Arrow, 
1973 and Spence, 1973). But, it also highlights the existence of labour underutilisation and 
under optimal employment. This situation can be connected at the opposite phenomenon 
preached by Akerlof (1984): the theory of efficient wages. This latter advances the idea that 
the productive effectiveness of an employee depends mainly on the feeling which it has "to be 
well treated" by his employer. Thus, to offer higher wages than the reservation ones 
constitutes a kind of gratification likely to encourage the individuals to increase their effort 
level. On the contrary, an overeducated worker can tend to become under productive by a fall 
in motivation (see for example, Tsang, 1987). The immediate consequence of this reduction is 
a repercussion on firm. Generalized at the productive system, it is the whole of the economy 
which is concerned. Overeducation can be a transitory phenomenon in the professional 
careers of the individuals but permanent for the economy (Rubb, 2003). However, the 
majority of work measures the unfavourable effect of overeducation on the individual wages 
                                                                                                                                                         
 
1 i.e. for a given job, required competences are lower than those accredited by the education system.  
2 In France, Baudelot and Glaude (1989) find also a degree devalorization.     3
(Guironnet, 2006a). These researches do not identify the causes, or consequences, of 
overeducation at an aggregate level.   
In this context, we propose to work on this new research, by analyzing the links 
between the economic growth and the overeducation situations. In particular, we seek to know 
how these two entities evolve, one compared to the other. In other words, we try to answer a 
key question: is the rise of overeducation phenomenon due to the unfavourable economic 
situations or does the general crisis of the economic system result from the overeducation 
development?   
From this point of view, we choose to work in term of causality (Granger, 1969; Engle 
and Granger, 1987) particularly adapted to these problems (Jaoul, 2004a). After a presentation 
of databases and methodology (I), we study, on one hand, the relations between education and 
wages (II) and, on the other hand, the links between overeducation and growth.  
 
I.  DATA, INDICATORS AND METHODOLOGY  
 
  Contrary to the previous studies, the interest of our approach in term of causality is to 
take into account the needs of labour market and the utilisation factor of employee 
competences. For this purpose, we choose to re-use the time series elaborate in a previous 
analysis (Guironnet, 2006b).  
 
Temporal indicators of overeducation and undereducation 
  To obtain homogeneous data over the period 1980-2002
3,
 our series are built with a 
wage downgrading measure (see framed #1 in appendices), initially investigated by Nauze-
Fichet and Tomasini (2002). In this step, we choose to favour in our analysis, the leavers of 
higher educational system. In this way, figure 1 (see below) presents the evolution of relative 
numbers (compared to the working population in employ) of higher education, overeducated 
and undereducated. 
                                                 
3 We are conscious that the number of observations is weak for   a study  in  time series. This study opening a 
new track of research, we do not have yet a data base more packed.    4
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Source: Employment surveys, INSEE.  
Field: working population in employment gathered by age groups. 
 
 
Globally, the mismatch evolution of the higher graduates is increasing. More and more 
trained, these leavers of educational system have greater difficulties to obtain an employment 
corresponding to their degree level. In addition, the increasing variation between the two 
curves shows a growing release of the links between degree level and wage. Nowadays, the 
overeducated share of higher education, compared to the whole of working population in 
employment, reached approximately 10% in 2002 against 2.6% in 1980. In the same time, the 
growth of undereducated population of the higher education moves from 0.9% in 1980 to 
3.3% in 2002. These two results lead us to think that the higher degree levels protect 
relatively from the overeducated risk at the recruitment time. However, this phenomenon is 
today not negligible for the most levels of the school hierarchy.   
In comparison to unemployment rate, the overeducation phenomenon displays comparable 
evolutions with a weak temporal delay. However, the changes in the economic situation are 
not the only explanatory factors. In effect, we can see some evolutions in opposite direction of 
the unemployment rate and the overeducated population of higher education, over these last 
years. The more prosperous periods of economic situation do not stop the downward trend of 
recruitment levels of the overeducation rate for the individuals (Fondeur, 1999). This 
observation leads us to think that the overeducation evolution would come from a more   5
structural phenomenon than the economic situation (Guironnet, 2006c). It would be the result 
of an increasing mismatch between supply and demand of graduates.       
Under these conditions, our objective is to study the consequences and causes of the 
growth structural of overeducation phenomenon on the individual wages and the GDP growth.   
 
Methodology 
The VAR models form a continuation of the work of Granger (1969) on the causal 
relation between two variables. Using this viewpoint, Sims proposes modelling that extends 
analysis of causality to a system of several variables. For this, he proposes to treat all the 
variables in an identical manner without a condition of exclusion or exogeneity and selecting 
the same delay for each of them in all the equations.  
A criticism often aimed at VAR models is the small amount of theory to which they 
refer, describing them as a-theoretical models. This 'theory versus measurement' debate had 
already opposed economists in the 1920s following the work of Mitchell (1913)
4 and 
reappeared in the 1980s with that of Sims. However, this debate is far from settled, and if 
VAR models are criticised for their lack of theory, the theoretical models of supporters of the 
Cowles Commission are also criticised for their lack of flexibility (Lucas, 1976)
5. In the face 
of these differences of opinion, our approach proposes the reconciliation of theory and 
measurement in proportions providing both the theoretical and empirical debate required in 
economics.  
  In these models, each equation of the model describes the evolution of a variable in 
function of its last values and of last values of the other variables of the system. 
Once the optimal lag ‘p’  has been determined, the analysis can then be taken in two 
directions: on the one hand, study of the dynamics of the model and on the other, analysis of 
causality. The latter has two forms: analysis of the long-run relationship using cointegration 
and the study of causality relationships. 
                                                 
4 The 'theory versus measurement' debate started in the analysis of Mitchell cycles (1913) that laid the empirical 
foundations of modern macroeconomic theory. 
5 Lucas (1976) used strong theoretical bases to argue that these models are fundamentally imperfect for assessing 
the consequences of the results of political alternatives. He puts forward the reason that, for example, their 
functioning plans little advice for political managers with regard to predicting changes of effect in economic 
policy because it is improbable that the parameters of the models remain stable under alternative economic 
policies.   6
  The existence of cointegration between variables implies that the framework within 
which the causality is examined is modified with a VECM (Vector Error Correcting Model), 
which takes into account this relation in order to avoid spurious regressions (Granger & 
Newbold, 1974). Indeed, when series are cointegrated, there is an estimation and the good 
quality of the model is only due to the fact that series are non stationary; in this case, forecasts 
made from the model are not robust.  
  In addition to the identification of the generating process of each variable of the model 
with unit root tests, the finality of a model VAR is the identification of the relations of 
causality between the variables Demonstrating causal relations between the economic 
variables enables better understanding of economic phenomena and brings supplementary 
information with regard to the anteriority of the events. This also engenders the establishment 
of an optimised economic policy.  
 
The definition of causality is given by Granger (1969): variable y1t causes variable y2t if 
the forecasting of the latter is improved by incorporating in the analysis information 
concerning y1t and its past. 
There are two approaches of causality: Granger (1969) and Sims (1980). Causality 
within the meaning of Granger (1969) relates to the propagation of interpretable deterministic 
impulses like modifications related to structural changes. On the contrary, the analysis of 
Sims (1980) is based on the propagation of stochastic impulses representative of "surprises". 
On the level of the results the two approaches are generally equivalent (Bruneau, 1996) but 
one chose here a test of Granger, because we consider that it is legitimate to associate the 
labour market and the higher education to a non stochastic context. 























































































































The test proceeds in two stages :  
-  Ho is tested: y2t does not cause y1t, that is to say that the coefficients of the matrix 
blocks B are nil. 
-  H’o is tested: y1t does not cause y2t, that is to say that the coefficients of the matrix 
blocks C are nil. 
It is then possible of calculates the sign of the relation of causality.    7




















If  η > 0,  the relation of causality is positive and we can confirm a complementarity 
between the two entities; if not, it is a relation of substitutability which is highlighted. 
 
I.  LINKS BETWEEN EDUCATION AND WAGES 
 
In this section, we choose a micro-econometric approach to analyze the qualification 
impacts on wages. Contrary to our second section devoted to a macro-econometric approach. 
According to this prospect, our objective is double: on the one hand, we pursue Jaoul’s work 
(2004b) in analysing the effects of higher qualifications on wage and in addition, we 
supplement this first analysis by the impact of the structural growth of overeducation 
phenomenon on the employee salaries.   
  Jaoul’s work (2004b) of the effect of the higher qualifications proposes an empirical 
evaluation of the theories of signal (Spence, 1973) and parchment (Berg, 1970).
6 According to 
Spence, the wages depend on the signal emitted by the degree attainment. In order to evaluate 
this model, we estimate the logarithm of wages according to the various levels of degrees. We 






11; high schools (Commercial school; engineer school); 
baccalaureate health and social; first cycles not validated. The estimation shows a positive 
influence of the degree levels of 3
rd cycle and high schools on the wages level and a negative 
influence of the other degrees. Indeed, a higher degree according to Spence’s theory, a higher 
degree generates a better signal to employers and implies a higher wage. Here, the two higher 
levels of degree have a positive influence on wages whereas the four lower levels of degree 
have negative influence on wages. It means that the signal emitted by the first ones is better 
for employers than the signal emitted by the four others.  This fact tends to confirm the 
analysis of Spence
 (see table #1 in appendices).
 
  For Berg, at the same level of study, there is a difference in wages between the 
individuals who failed the examination and those which obtained the degree. To test this 
                                                 
6This analysis uses the Cereq database, "Generation 98".  
7 Degree awarded after 2 years in academic higher education. 
8 Degree awarded after 2 years of studies after baccalaureate in a technical school. 
9 Degree awarded after 2 years in academic higher education for a professional scientific specialisation.  
10 Bachelor’s degree. 
11 PhD and Master’s degrees.   8
assumption, we consider the individuals having followed a first cycle after the baccalaureate. 
This whole of individuals is divided in two samples: individuals of first cycle having the 
degree and individuals without corresponding degree. The Darmois test (1934) of averages 
comparison (here wages) of two samples, leads us to accept the Berg assumption: there is a 
significant difference in wages between graduate and individuals without corresponding 
degree. The actual degree attainment is one of the determinants of individual wages. 
 
  However, these analyses neglect the demand side of labour market. Indeed, what do 
these results become when we take into account the overeducation situations for the 
individuals? Accordingly, we produce two types of analysis: in the first time, one is interested 
at the overeducated workers and, in the second time, we undertake a similar study for the 
undereducated workers. Thus, we are lead to consider the following variables:
12 
•  Overeducated workers of the higher degree (OHD);  
•  Undereducated workers without higher degree (UHD);  
•  the annual average wages of the working population in employment 
(AWPE);  
 
Unit root tests (Elliott, Rothenberg & Stock, 1996) shows that the variables are 
stationary.  A necessary condition of cointegration between two variables being that these last 
are integrated in the same order, there isn’t relation of cointegration between the various 
variables. Thus, one can show an absence of long term relation between the studied variables.  
With these results, we find the Rubb’s idea (2003) concerning the transitory character of the 
overeducation influence on the professional careers.  The test of causality highlights only one 






This relation is confirmed by the variance decomposition: wages are more sensitive to 
a variation of the overeducated workers without any degree of the higher education (95 %) 
that the latter are not sensitive to a wage variation (2 %). So, an increase in overeducated 
workers, with a low level of qualification, produces a positive effect on the corresponding 
wages. For the individuals, it is more profitable to continue their school course to the 
baccalaureate level (or formation of a similar level) that the overeducation risks produce an 
advantage in wage term. On the contrary, we do not find any significant relation between the 
                                                 
12 We reason in growth rate for each one of our variables.  
                             + 
UHD Æ   AWPE 
   9
overeducated workers of higher education and the wages. The overeducation, for the highest 
levels of degree hierarchy, does not modify the profit prospects, in particular their relative 
advantage in term of salary (high schools and 3
rd cycles).     
In our second analysis, the variables taken into account are identical but concern the 
undereducated workers. However, the econometric analysis does not reveal any relation 
between the variables. Thus, we can conclude that these mismatches do not produce any 
unfavourable wage effect. On the contrary, our analysis in term of causality reveals a wage 
advantage for the overeducated workers holding a qualification level lower or equal to the 
general baccalaureate. In long period, the employees must adopt a strategy to protect 
themselves from their not-adaptability to anticipate the future developments and the new 
needs of firm competences. 
 
II.  LINKS BETWEEN EDUCATION AND GROWTH  
 
The object of this second analysis is to study the impact of the overeducation 
evolution, either on the individual wages, but on the national income. Indeed, in a previous 
study (Jaoul, 2004b), we had highlighted a relation between higher education and economic 
growth over the period 1820-2000. However, we have found an absence of relation since 
1950. This observation reflects a lack of coordination between the economic and educational 
policies. These results translate the problems of France to adapt its higher educational system 
at the economic system.   
A more specific analysis in degree terms (Jaoul, 2002) underlined the impact of the 
high levels of degrees (higher education degrees) on the French economic growth. Among 
them, the doctorates, and more particularly those of the health sector (Medicine and 
Pharmacy) have a positive influence on the national income (Jaoul, 2004b). However this 
analysis does not take account the possible effects of the mismatches between training and 
employment.    
Also, the objective is here to determine in which way the overeducation evolution has 
an impact on the economy. For this purpose, we consider the growth rates of the following 
variables:    
•  GDP;  
•  The share of overeducated workers of the higher education (SOHE);  
•  The share of overeducated workers without any degree of higher 
education (SOWHE). 
Unit root tests reveal a stationnarity of all variables. These last do not present any relation of 
long term what tends to contradict Rubb (2003) and the permanent character of the   10
overeducation on economy. On the short term, only a causality relationship is highlighted 






Thus, a share increase of overeducated workers of the higher education produces an 
unfavourable effect on the economic growth. Over these two last decades, we find that the 
recruitment of overqualification workers would produce a growth deceleration rather than 
unfavourable economic conditions producing an increase of overvaluation competences 
during the candidate recruitments. In addition, we find a similar result to that established in a 
previous study with the same database (Guironnet, 2006b): the overeducated workers of 




With an increasing phenomenon of overeducation over these two last decades, the 
overeducation literature shows an unfavourable effect of this phenomenon on wages. 
However, the overeducation phenomenon is not without advantage: for a given job, the 
overeducated workers have always higher wages compared to the workers adequately 
matched (Sloane and al., 1999). Moreover, overschooling can lead to an advantageous 
situation with the valorization of the professional experience.
14  
From twenty two years of French productivity, our analysis in productivity term seems 
to confirm that the overeducation phenomenon does not produce any unfavourable effect on 
the individual level. More precisely, this phenomenon would produce on the one hand some 
advantages for the least qualified workers. On the other hand, it would not affect, or little, the 
most qualified workers: the latter preserving their wage advantage (in particular for high 
schools and 3
rd cycles). Thus, the credentalism scenario
15 or the qualification inflation does 
not seem irrational: the individual prospect, to obtain highest levels of feasible degree, 
                                                 
13 Relationship between GDP and Under-education has also been studied and results show that there’s not causal 
link. 
14This type of result falls under the theory of the professional courses (Sicherman, 1991). Empirical work, taking 
again these assumptions, shows that the overeducation would produce an advantageous effect on the 
development of professional careers, as well in term of promotions than wages (Groeneveld and Hartog, 2004; 
Dekker  et al., 2002).     
- 
SOHE   Æ GDP   11
involves always a rentable investment. However, our analysis exceeds this individual 
framework in analyzing the links between overeducation and GDP growth.  
Indeed, and paradoxically, we find that this phenomenon seems to reduce the GDP 
growth. This result is pregnant in term of policies of professional insertion: over these last 
decades, the French policy tends to reduce the unemployment of young people, in particular 
for the least qualified (see “young employment
16” and “apprenticeship contract
17”). However, 
they must improve now professional insertion of the most qualified in the way that the latter 
can find an employment corresponding to their educational level. Such prospect would allow 
reduce the underutilization of the most qualified and would make it possible to improve the 
economic growth.
18  
However, this document is registered like a new research and our results can be 
considered as intuitive. Our objective is to underline the possible character of an unfavourable 
effect of the overeducation phenomenon on growth and to catch a particular attention at the 
professional insertion of most graduate. Other studies must supplement this analysis: for 
example, the series developments over a longer period would undoubtedly make it possible to 
specify our results. In the same way, the formalization of macroeconomic models would 













                                                                                                                                                         
15See Spence (op. cit.).  
16 Employment contract in definite duration (maximum 5 years), for young people (from 18 to 26 years old) in 
unemployment, to finance job of public utility. 
17 Employment contract in definite duration (between 1 and 3 years) for young people (from 16 to 26 years old) 
which enables to young people to acquire a professional qualification and a technological degree. 
18For an approximate evaluation of the profits of expected growth, the concerned reader can consult Guironnet’s 
article (2006b).    12
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ANNEXES 
Framed 1  
"WAGE" DOWNGRADING AND UPGRADING  
 
An individual will be considered as overeducated (resp. undereducated) so more than 50% of 
holder individuals of the immediately lower degree (resp. higher) gain more (resp. less) that 
this last.  
With this technique, we determine a relational indicator "degree-employment" which is 
homogeneous over a long period. It is not affected by "biased technical progress" and the 
mechanism of "degree inflation". However, this measurement remains affected by other 
factors contributing to the wage heterogeneity of population.     
 
 
Tableau 1 – Estimation of Spence model 
LEAST SQUARES AJUSTMENT WITH CONSTANT TERM - 12730 INDIVIDUALSS 
 
 TITLE       COEFFICIENT       S.D.     STUDENT    PROB.    TEST VALUE 
  
 3rd cycle         303.7080     10.406   29.187    0.000    28.71 
 Bac health social -91.9549    10.333      8.899    0.000    -8.88 
 Bac+1 +2 dip       -266.6343      6.311   42.246    0.000   -40.87 
 Bac+1 +2 no dip  -389.2516      7.361   52.882    0.000   -50.28 
 High school       564.9465    11.402   49.546    0.000    47.38 
 2nd cycle        -120.8137      7.786   15.516    0.000   -15.44 
 constant        1478.4875      4.081      362.259    0.000     175.69 
 
SUM SQUARED RESID ...........    SSR =  1969392256.0000 
MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT  R  =    0.5642    R² =    0.3184 
ESTIMATED VARIANCE OF RESIDS      S² =  54777.7656   S =  393.4181 
FISHER TEST = 1188.569          DF = 512724 
P.CRIT      =  0.0000       TEST V.=  69.60 





DR n°2007 - 01  :   María Noel PI ALPERIN, Michel TERRAZA 
« Test d’inférence statistique de l’indice multidimensionnel flou de 
pauvreté appliqué à l’Argentine » 
 
DR n°2007 - 02  :   Romina BOARINI, Christine LE CLAINCHE 
« Social Preferences on Public Intervention : an empirical 






                                                           











































Thierry BLAYAC :     blayac@lameta.univ-montp1.fr 
Valérie CLEMENT :    clement@lameta.univ-montp1.fr 